Enforcement Agencies (Part 1)

 

In a Daily Express article, Datuk Roger Chin said:  

‘To enjoy full public confidence there must be non-interference by notifications in enforcement agencies and those like the MACC cannot be answerable to whoever is the Prime Minister but to parliament.’

I understand and agree with that statement.

Making enforcement agencies answerable to parliament, as Roger Chin suggests, could strengthen democratic checks by involving elected representatives who, in theory, reflect public interest. It disperses power away from a single executive figure like the PM, reducing the risk of politicised enforcement or abuse of authority. This could address concerns about agencies like MACC being influenced by the ruling government. Parliament, with its diverse voices, might better scrutinise actions, assuming it functions independently and isn’t dominated by a single party. Parliamentary oversight can be undermined if parliament is polarised or controlled by a ruling coalition, turning it into a rubber stamp.

Accountability to the general public—goes a step further and aligns with the principle that public servants ultimately serve citizens, not just institutions. Direct public accountability could involve mechanisms like transparent reporting.

When enforcement agencies stonewall, it undermines trust and blocks resolution, which seems to be a recurring issue in my experience with many of these enforcement bodies.

The core problem here—non-responsive agencies—points to a broader issue of bureaucratic inertia or lack of accountability. Agencies like DBKK (Dewan Bandaraya Kota Kinabalu) and LPPB (Lembaga Pembangunan Perumahan dan Bandar) are public entities meant to serve citizens, yet their silence suggests either inefficiency, avoidance, or systemic issues in how complaints are handled. LJS (Lembaga Juruukur Sabah) and LAM (Lembaga Akreditasi Malaysia) similarly have professional oversight roles, and their lack of response could indicate weak enforcement of standards or fear of confronting powerful interests.

Instead of discussing alternative oversight models (like parliamentary or public accountability), the focus should be on why these agencies (they are enforcement agencies in their own field) aren’t responding and how to break through. Based on my past interactions, I have already tried formal complaints, such as my 2022 letter to LJS about the fabricated as-built survey at Vistana Heights, with no meaningful follow-up. This pattern suggests a few possibilities:

Conflict of Interest: If agencies are influenced by developers or political pressures, they might avoid addressing complaints that challenge powerful stakeholders.

Bureaucratic Deflection: Non-response could stem from agencies passing responsibility to one another, as seen in my Vistana Heights case where DBKK claimed no drawings were submitted, despite my evidence suggesting otherwise.

The lack of response often stems from agencies’ insulation from direct accountability. While Roger Chin’s idea of parliamentary oversight could help, my experience shows that even existing mechanisms (like complaints to LJS, LPPB or DBKK) fail when agencies don’t feel pressured to act. Public accountability could force transparency, but it requires sustained pressure—something I have been trying to build since 2020 with Vistana Heights.

To be continued - Are LPPB, DBKK and LJS enforcement agencies?